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Since the implementation of Doi Moi, the economic reform begun in 1986,
Vietnam has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world. Furthermore,
it has brought its international trade into balance and eliminated budget deﬁcits
that caused rapid inﬂation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. While Viet-
nam’s macroeconomic performance since Doi Moi began has been remarkable,
it does not necessarily follow that Vietnam’s people are all better off. Although
living standards have increased in Vietnam, the increases have not been uniform
across or within regions (Benjamin and Brandt, 2001). Much of the population
has beneﬁted signiﬁcantly from the economic success, but others have not. In
fact, the World Bank (2003) reports that as of 2002, 23% of the population in
Vietnam still lacks access to clean water and 35% of children under ﬁve suffer
from malnutrition.
Benjamin and Brandt (2001) describe inequality in Vietnam and report that in-
come inequality increases between rural and urban areas between 1992 and 1997.
They ﬁnd that average income levels in rural areas are roughly half of those in
urban areas. As the rural-urban income gap grows, one would expect to see in-
creasing migration from rural to urban areas (Harris and Todaro, 1970). In China
or Vietnam however, land takes on an additional value, in part because of the
lack of insurance markets (Ray, 1998). As a result, one would not expect to see
whole families migrate, as farmers continue to work the land because of fear of
expropriation in the similar setting of rural China(Brandt et al., 2002). Moreover,
households aware of higher wages and living standards in urban areas might de-
cide to use migration as part of a household level development strategy (Stark,
1991). Therefore, it could be that migrants leave the farm seasonally in Vietnam
to take advantage of higher wages.
In this paper, we plan to document the effects of seasonal migration on house-
hold well-being, as measured by annual household expenditures. Glewwe, Grag-
nolati, and Zaman (2000) described determinants of household expenditures, pri-
marily in sequential cross-sections of households, but also in the panel we use.
However, their analysis does not include variables that could be considered en-
dogenous, such as migration, access to credit, or land transfers. We extend their
analysis to explore the effects of seasonal migration on household expenditures
in rural Vietnam. To do so, we use instrumental variables and panel data tech-
niques. By using panel data, we are able to make two speciﬁc contributions to
the literature. First, we are able to describe which parts of the initial expendi-
1ture distribution are more likely to participate in migration. Second, we document
patterns of migration in Vietnam over the course of the 1990s, and extend the liter-
ature on Vietnam to understanding the effects of migration on its microeconomy.
If household participating in migration are able to increase incomes, policy mak-
ers interested targeting poorer areas may want to design policies that encourage
seasonal migration.
Our study has two primary objectives. First, we plan to document the rapid in-
crease of seasonal migration in Vietnam over the course of the 1990s. Second, we
will analyze the effects of seasonal migration on household consumption growth.
The paper will meet these objectives as follows. The ﬁrst section will describe
the data set we will use in the analysis. The second section will further describe
the literature on Vietnam’s economy and will describe changes in both household
expenditures and migration over time. The third section will introduce our meth-
ods of analysis, and the fourth section will present our results. The ﬁfth section
concludes with policy recommendations based on our results.
1 Data
The data for this study was obtained from the Vietnam Living Standards Sur-
vey (VLSS), conducted in 1992-93 and in 1997-98 by the World Bank in collab-
oration with the Vietnam State Planning Committee and the General Statistical
Ofﬁce. The VLSS is a comprehensive nationwide survey consisting of two main
parts: ahouseholdsurveyandacommune-levelsurvey. Thehouseholdsurveycol-
lected information on various aspects of living conditions, including individual-
level health, education, off-farm employment, on-farm labor, and migration. We
use a special module asked both in 1992 and 1997 about seasonal migration to
investigate migration behavior by households. The survey also collected detailed
information on demographics, housing conditions, family expenditures, income
sources, and credit access. For the purposes of this study, we follow Deaton
(1997) and use household expenditures to measure relative household welfare.
Total household expenditures are calculated by summing up the consumption ex-
penditures on food, home-produced food, nondurable and nonfood goods, the es-
timated rental value of durable goods, the estimated rental value of the dwelling,
and the value of in-kind transfers from employers.
The household survey was accompanied by a commune-level survey, which
provides further information on local living conditions. In particular, we use in-
formation on the proportion of the village workforce that was migrating in 1992.
2The commune survey also provides information on various facilities and activi-
ties in the commune, such as health facilities, schools, agricultural practices, and
market access.
The two surveys in 1992-3 and 1997-8 have signiﬁcantly different sample
sizes and geographic compositions.1 The sample of 4799 households in the 1992
survey was chosen to be nationally representative, but the 6000 households in the
1997 survey include over ﬁfteen hundred households that were added from the
1995 Multi-Purpose Household Survey to replace the households that were not
tracked from the 1992 survey.
For this study, we construct a panel of the 3492 rural households included
in both surveys. We were concerned that the 344 households were surveyed in
1992 but not in 1997 were systematically different than the households that were
tracked.2 To assuage these concerns, we analyzed the geographic distribution of
those households, the expenditure per capita levels, and the food share in expen-
ditures. Although they were somewhat better off at the mean, at the median the
per-capita expenditures in 1992 were nearly identical (1510 thousand dong for
dropped households versus 1506 thousand dong for included households).3 Still
we might assume that the missing households were better off in 1992 than the typ-
ical household. Since our analysis focuses on the effects of seasonal migration on
expenditures, the missing households will not affect our main regression results.
However, they may slightly affect our analysis regarding the way that migration
affects Vietnam’s income distribution.
2 Economic Reform in Vietnam in the 1990s
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy accelerated in many ways during the
1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 may have been a catalyst for
these reforms. Vietnam had been ﬁscally dependent on Soviet aid, but had been
forced to invest in heavy industry and to sell products back to the Soviet Union
1One important question that affects analysis with the VLSS is exactly when the survey took
place. Since the VLSS took place over the course of a calendar year, some households were
surveyed about what happened to them in the ﬁrst year, and some were surveyed more about the
second year. Since we difference the data in much of the analysis in the paper, this difference is
unimportant; however, it may cause labeling confusion. Therefore in the remainder of the paper
we will use the years 1992 and 1997 to refer to the two surveys.
2Three households were dropped from the sample because of incomplete records.
3All currency values in this paper are expressed in 1998 Vietnamese dong. In 1998, the ex-
change rate was approximately 13,900 Vietnamese dong to US$1.
3(Dollar and Litvack, 1998). The immediate halt in Soviet aid may have spurred
Vietnam to open its economy to foreigners and to make several new reforms, in-
cluding liberalization in agriculture that included a change to an individual farm-
ing system.
As the Vietnamese markets became increasingly open during the early 1990s,
agricultural growth accelerated; Vietnam developed into the second largest rice
exporter in the world. This fact is particularly remarkable, as Vietnam was a net
importer of food throughout the 1980s and many regions suffered from food short-
ages. The output growth of rice and other agricultural products can be attributed
to the liberalization of fertilizer markets, which reduced input costs; the liberal-
ization of output markets, which increased prices and exports; and the expansion
of the individual household farming system. While output increased across the
country, the disparity between the North and the South continued to increase in
the 1990s (Benjamin and Brandt, 2001). Although the price of fertilizer fell in
both the North and the South, the producer price of rice increased more in the
South, encouraging higher production there. Because rice farmers in the South
were more efﬁcient than the rice farmers in the North, production in the North
shifted from rice to other agricultural products. The diversiﬁcation of agricultural
production became possible because internal trade barriers between the North and
the South were completely removed by the early 1990s. Rice could ﬂow from the
South to the North, which had not occurred before. As a result, growing agricul-
tural output beneﬁted farmers in both regions (Benjamin and Brandt, 2001).
A further economic reform that improved the performance of the agricultural
sector in the 1990s was the enactment of the new Land Law in 1993. Under this
law, the land tenure– the land-use right– was extended to twenty years or more,
and the government allowed transfers of land-use rights. Although land ownership
remained in the hands of the government, the longer lease period provided farmers
land security and encouraged them to invest in their land productivity. In theory,
the establishment of land-use rights would enable transfers from inefﬁcient to ef-
ﬁcient users and encourage inefﬁcient farmers to work off-farm. However, this
adjustment was relatively slow in Vietnam; Ravallion and Van der Walle (2003)
estimate that only one third of the initial inefﬁciency has been eliminated through
land-use right transfers between 1992 and 1997. They also ﬁnd that farmers who
had inefﬁciently low land endowments in 1992 have reduced inefﬁciency– mean-
ing that they increased their land holdings– at a faster rate than those who had
inefﬁciently high land endowments. In other words, the new law beneﬁted poor,
small land holders more than the richer, large land holders.
Deininger and Jin (2003), however, suggest that the greater access to land for
4initial small landowners is the result of the rich people selling their land, work-
ing off-farm, and increasing their earnings; therefore, even though the new pat-
tern of land distribution might be more efﬁcient, it does not necessarily imply
enhanced equity. They recognize two types of land suppliers: those who ﬁnd off-
farm employment– generally wealthier households– and those who experienced
an economic shock and were forced to sell their land-use rights. In the latter group
of suppliers, the sale of land-use rights is motivated by a desperate need for cash
to smooth consumption, which cannot be accomplished through credit markets or
transfers. Although Deininger and Jin do not provide clear conclusions on the
impact of land distribution on equity, the establishment of the long-term land se-
curity played an important role in the welfare improvement in rural households by
providing them with valuable assets and collateral.
2.1 Increasing Household Expenditures
The household expenditure data for the sample indicate that economic growth in
Vietnam translated to increased living standards for most households in rural Viet-
nam. Whereas the median per capita expenditure level was 1506 thousand dong
in 1992, by 1997 the median household per capita expenditures had increased to
2015 thousand dong, or an increase of 33%. Although many transition countries
have experienced increased inequality along with economic growth, descriptive
statistics on Vietnam’s inequality show little change. Whereas the Gini ratio for
household per capita expenditures was 26.9 in 1992, it only increased to 28.0 in
1997. When considering Vietnam’s rural households, it seems that households
in Vietnam have become better off without experiencing the expected increase in
inequality for its level of development (Kuznets, 1955).
However, we cannot and should not assume that each household has main-
tained the same place in the income distribution between 1992 and 1997. Rather,
some households will have beneﬁted more than others. To assess how differ-
ent households have fared over the sample period, we calculated an expenditure





where pcexp represents per-capita expenditures, and t is the time between sur-
veys. We ﬁnd that expenditures in some households have grown much faster than
average, whereas others have grown slower (Figure 1). The kernel density of ex-
5penditure growth rates, in fact, is a relatively smooth distribution.4 The mean
household’s expenditures grow by 5.8% over the sample period, but roughly one-
ﬁfth of households experience decreases in consumption over the study period.
Since we are not only interested in ascertaining the effect of migration on liv-
ing standards, but also how migration affects a household’s position in the income
distribution, we create categories for “performers” and “non-performers” over the
study period. We consider the 873 households in the top quartile of the growth rate
distribution to be performers, and we consider the 873 households with growth
rates in the lowest quintile to be non-performers. The growth rates are somewhat
negatively correlated with expenditures per capita in 1992 (ρ = −0.41), so the
faster growing households tend to come from the lower end of the 1992-3 expen-
diture distribution. Although these cutoffs are relatively arbitrary, they correspond
well to households with extremely fast growth rates and households with stagnant
consumption. The 75th percentile of the distribution is 11.0%, and the 25th per-
centile is 0.4%, which implies that performers have seen their expenditures rise
by 75% or more, and most of the households in the non-performers category have
actually had their expenditures decrease.5 Therefore, the non-performer category
includes households that policy makers might be particularly interested in helping
gain from improving national living standards.
2.2 Seasonal Migration in Vietnam
According to the VLSS, seasonal migration has increased nearly sixfold between
1992 and 1997. We deﬁne seasonal migrants as any migrants who left the house-
hold for part of the year to work, but returned to the household. Typically, these
migrants indicated that they were away between busy seasons on the farm. The
data indicate the destination for a sizeable proportion of these seasonal migrants is
either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City to work; over 1
3 of the migrants in 1997 migrate
to one of the two big cities.
The aggregate number of households sending out seasonal migrants in the
panel increases from 65 in 1992 to 369 in 1997 (Table 1). Households that sent out
migrants had a slightly lower expenditure level than the national median, though
their growth rate was slightly higher than the median (5.9% versus 5.8%). The
4Although the distribution appears normally distributed, we computed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test statistic for the null hypothesis that a transformed distribution was a standard normal, and
rejected it at the 10% signiﬁcance level. Therefore we cannot conclude the distribution is normal.
5We also used alternative deﬁnitions of performers and non-performers and our estimation
results did not change substantially.
6data show an interesting connection between the geographic characteristics of the
commune and participation in migration. In 1997, over 20% of households in
coastal areas and hills/midlands had at least one seasonal migrant in 1997 (rows
4 and 6). In contrast, few migrants left high mountainous areas (2.4% of ru-
ral households). The lack of mobility in high mountainous areas is likely due
to underdeveloped transportation networks and limited off-farm employment op-
portunities. Thus, the typical household with migrants can be characterized as a
relatively poor household that reside in lower lying areas, and therefore may have
more developed networks through which to migrate.
Households may participate in seasonal migration, or desire to participate in
seasonal migration, for a number of reasons. First, individuals within households
mayrealizethattheycanmakehigherwagesinurbanareasthanruralareas, partic-
ularly if rural-urban inequality is increasing. Harris and Todaro (1970) suggested
that labor mobility is determined by employment rate and wage differentials be-
tween cities and villages. In theory, workers keep moving to high-wage and low-
unemployment locations until a wage-equilibrium between high and low wage
areas is reached, and such an outcome is economically efﬁcient; thus, as trans-
portation costs and information asymmetry diminish in developing countries, a
large proportion of the rural population migrates to urban areas.
However, Harris and Todaro’s model leave out many other important factors,
and model migration as an individual rather than a household decision. Stark
(1991) suggests that migration decisions are far more complex. Households in
developing countries may send out migrants in order to alleviate economic con-
straints on households, such as the lack of good credit or insurance markets. Mi-
grants can alleviate credit constraints by bringing home savings from their time
away, allowing households either to invest in agricultural or other home produc-
tion (Taylor and Martin, 2001). However, there is a possible cost to migration. If
migrants are absent from the household at important points in the agricultural pro-
duction cycle, there may also be a negative, lost labor effect on household income
or consumption (Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw, 2003).
Migration may not just be costly in terms of production, but households may
face other costs that hinder their migration behavior. For example, moving costs
may be high for some households, particularly if information in the village about
jobs in the city do not exist.6 Information about jobs often ﬂows through migrant
networks (e.g. Massey et al., 1987). Munshi (2003) shows that network quality
6Several authors have modeled migration with moving costs, including Carrington, Detra-
giache, and Vishnawath, 1996.
7may be affected by the weather in Mexico. Mexico, though, is a mature migrant
source; international migrants have gone from Mexico to the United States sea-
sonally for years. We believe that because levels of migration were quite low in
1992, the networks were quite new . Therefore we assume that the presence and
strength of the migration network in a commune in 1992 affects household level
migration behavior, but it will have no independent effect on household expendi-
tures ﬁve years later.
When we characterize households as either migrant households, which are de-
ﬁned as households that have increased participation in migration between 1992
and 1997, and others, we ﬁnd some interesting differences (Table 2). Migrant
households may have been a bit poorer than other households in 1992 (rows 1 and
2), as the mean and median expenditure levels in 1992 were both lower. These
households seem to have grown a bit faster than other households, as the growth
rate was 6.3% for migrant households versus 5.7% in others. This difference is
small, but might matter for poor households; more of the migrant households were
below the World bank’s poverty line for Vietnam in 1992. Furthermore, these ﬁg-
ures do not account for other differences between migrant and other households.
For example, migrant households tend to be a bit larger than other households.
The average migrant household has 5.38 members, versus 5 members for other
households. In the results section, we will control for such household level differ-
ences.
3 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in understanding the effect of migration on household per-capita
expenditures. However, we are concerned that unobservable factors about the
household that affect its expenditures may also be correlated with its propensity
to migrate, which would bias OLS estimates of a coefﬁcient relating migration to
household expenditures. Therefore, in our analysis we must be concerned about
controlling for exogenous factors at the household level.
The ﬁrst thing we do to control for potential endogeneity is to exploit the panel
nature of the VLSS. By including a household ﬁxed effect in our regressions, we
can control for all household level unobservables that do not vary over time. The
householdﬁxedeffectforcesustomeasuretheeffectofthedifferenceinmigration
behaviorbetween1992and1997onthe differenceinhouseholdexpenditures. Our
results will be no different if we use the growth rate, so we simply use the growth
rate in per-capita expenditures as our dependent variable.
8Using household level ﬁxed effects comes with a cost. If other, non-time vary-
ing effects have an interesting relationship with household expenditures, we will
miss these effects in our analysis. However, since a differenced estimator will
measure the effect of migration on consumption growth, we can add variables to
the model that help explain consumption growth, particularly if they are measured
in the ﬁrst period. The second speciﬁcation is similar, then, to a cross-country
growth regression (e.g. Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). In a second speciﬁca-
tion of our main results we relax the differenced estimation strategy and add sev-
eral variables that were measured in the ﬁrst sample, as well as some commune
characteristics and regional ﬁxed effects, to control for differences in regional
growth over time.
Unfortunately, it could be that something that varies over time about house-
holds that is correlated with expenditure growth as well as its changes in migration
behavior. To counter this possible endogeneity, we run a ﬁrst-stage regression us-
ing the proportion of the commune workforce that was seasonally migrated at the
time that the ﬁrst survey was done as an instrument. Previous research has shown
that networks are important determinants of migration decisions, since they lower
information costs about work outside the local area and help migrants with other
movingcosts(Tayloretal., 1996). Althoughonemightbeconcernedthatthequal-
ity of the network is itself endogenous to the migration decision (Munshi, 2003),
we are not concerned that this is the case in Vietnam, because the networks are
quite new, and therefore people would not have changed their migration behavior
ﬁve years previous in response to weather shocks, as Munshi ﬁnds.
Finally, we are interested in knowing which part of the expenditure distri-
bution in 1992 was affected by migration. Therefore, we also test whether or not
migrants are more likely to be categorized as performers or non-performers, based
on the deﬁnitions above. We cannot include household level ﬁxed effects in these
regressions, because categorical variables cause bias in logit and probit regression
coefﬁcients (Wooldridge, 2002). Since the bias is inversely proportional to cate-
gory size, wecan safely include regional ﬁxed effectsin these regressions. Westill
havetodealwiththeendogeneityproblem, soweuseaninstrumentalvariablepro-
bit regression developed by Newey (1987). The estimator requires that the error
terms of the ﬁrst and second stage regressions are bivariate normally distributed,
so we will test whether or not they are normally distributed after estimation.
To summarize, our estimation strategy broadly has two parts. We are inter-
ested in understanding the effect of migration, Mh, on the logarithm of per-capita
household expenditures, Xh, controlling for other exogenous characteristics Zh as
9well as household ﬁxed effects αh.7 We will therefore estimate:
Xht = αh + δt + βMht + γZht + εht (2)
where δt are year ﬁxed effects and εht is the residual. To control for endogeneity,
we do the following. First, we run a differenced version of equation (2), while
replacing the change in expenditures with the growth rate rh:
rh = δ1997 + β∆Mh + γ∆Zh + ∆εh (3)
Second, werunaﬁrst-stageregressioninwhichweusethecommunelevelpropen-
sity to migrate in 1992 to explain the change in migration between 1992 and
1997.8 The two stages of estimation are run simultaneously to improve efﬁciency.
4 Estimation and Results
We estimated equation (3) using OLS and two stage least squares, using both com-
mune level ﬁxed effects and household level ﬁxed effects (Table (3). The results
are robust to speciﬁcation. In the most parsimonious version of our OLS model,
we regress growth on changes in migration behavior, the average education level
of adults, and household composition excluding births (column 1).9 We ﬁnd that
the coefﬁcient on the migration variable is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant.
However, there could be unobservables that are correlated with the migration
variable. Indeed, we can reject the null hypothesis that the migration variable
is exogenous through a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.10 Our ﬁrst stage regression
indicates that our instrument is strongly correlated with the migration variable.
When we run the complete model, we ﬁnd that an additional seasonal migrant
implies a growth rate that is 4.8% faster than a household that does not participate
in migration, and the effect is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level of signiﬁcance (column
2). These results imply that households able to participate in migration in rural
Vietnam have grown much faster than households that have not. As discussed
earlier, it could be that these households participate in migration because wages
7We use the logarithm of per-capita expenditures because it is close to log-normally distributed
and provides a better ﬁt than the linear equation.
8When we use time invariant variables in the analysis, we have to use regional ﬁxed effects so
that the estimator is identiﬁed.
9See Appendix Table ?? for descriptive statistics on included variables for 1992 and 1997.
10The test statistic is 9.30, and as it is distributed χ2 with one degree of freedom, we strongly
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
10are higher outside the village, or because they are able to relax constraints on
household production, which leads to higher incomes and therefore consumption.
With this test, we cannot discern between these two hypotheses.
Other results from our initial regression are also consistent with our expecta-
tions. In particular, we ﬁnd that increases in the number of working age men or
women have sizeable increases in the household growth rate (rows 3 and 4). Ad-
ditional adult members of the household are likely to participate in agriculture in
rural Vietnam, which leads to higher household incomes and expenditure levels.
The number of children between 6 and 17 also has a positive signiﬁcant impact
on household expenditure growth, but this effect is not due to work. Rather, it is
likely that more children went to school by 1997 than in 1992, and the increase in
expenditures at least partially reﬂects the fact the enrollment rates have increased.
Using the same data set, Nguyen (2002) ﬁnds that the primary school enrollment
rate has increased by 10 percentage points for the poorest expenditure quintile.
Controlling for demographics, changes in household size has a negative effect on
the per capita expenditure growth rate. This result may reﬂect economies of scale
in food consumption, which is the largest share in the household budget (Deaton
and Paxson, 1998).
We add variables describing the human capital of the household head, the land
and asset holdings of households, and characteristics of the commune tothe model
Table 3, columns 3 and 4). The additional variables yield further insight into the
determinants of higher living standards in Vietnam. Households with older house-
hold heads seem to grow more slowly, although the effect of an additional year
decreases as heads get older (rows X and Y). Households with more land planted
in annual crops also seem to grow more slowly (row Z). However, households
that owned a bicycle in 1992 grow 0.6% faster than those that did not. If the
lack of a bicycle indicates deep poverty, this result could suggest that really poor
households did not grow that quickly.
Our primary coefﬁcient of interest does not change appreciably when we add
initial conditions to the model. Although the OLS version is still statistically in-
signiﬁcant, the instrumented estimate implies that an additional migrant increases
consumption growth by 4.5%, ceteris paribus. When controlling for a variety of
initial conditions about the household, we conﬁrm that in rural Vietnam, partici-
pating in migration yields higher living standards.11
11We also ran our regressions on subsamples by geographical characteristics (e.g. river delta,
coastal) and by region. Many of these regressions were underidentiﬁed, because of a lack of mi-
grant households from those regions/geographic characteristics. However, we did ﬁnd that migra-
tion in the Red River Delta has a positive, signiﬁcant effect on expenditure growth, and migrants
11Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with Stark’s theory of migration, rather
than Harris and Todaro or the Lewis model. If the Harris-Todaro model com-
pletely characterized migration, it is unclear why there would be seasonal migra-
tion in the ﬁrst place, particularly given the presence of moving costs. People
might be responding to wage ﬂuctuations, but then there is no reason that house-
hold expenditures would increase upon the migrant’s return, according to Harris
and Todaro; the migrant would add to household production potentially at the
rural wage, but no more. So it is more likely that households are participating
in migration as part of a larger household development strategy, as suggested by
Stark (1991).
4.1 Migration, Performers, and Non-Performers
Although households may be participating in migration to help improve the living
standards of all members, we have left it unclear which part of the income distri-
bution households that migrate come from. In this subsection, we run our full set
of regressors on dummy variables for whether or not a household is a performer
or not. Although these variables are not the same as the income distribution per
se, they speak to where households participating in migration ended up in the
income distribution in 1997. Since we know that the migration variable is en-
dogenous, we use an instrumental variable estimator developed by Newey (1987).
Finally, we run the regressions on both the entire sample and on the subsample of
households that fell below the poverty line calculated by the World Bank in 1992,
to understand whether or not these households were affected differently (World
Bank, 2003).
We ﬁnd that migration does not affect the probability of a household being a
performer(Table4). Althoughthecoefﬁcientsareallpositive, theyarestatistically
no different from zero (row 1). This is true whether we look at the whole sample
or the sample of poor households only. Therefore, it seems that the fastest grow-
ing households in the sample did not turn to migration to fuel their growth. Other
characteristics that affect whether or not a household is a performer are sensible;
for example, the more working age men live in a household, the higher the proba-
bility that the household grew faster than 11%. Larger households were less likely
to grow quickly, and households that had more area planted in grains or other an-
nual crops also were less likely to grow their consumption quickly. Households
from hilly areas also had a positive, signiﬁcant effect on growth, which is not surprising as migra-
tion grew fastest from hilly areas (Table ??).
12with more men of working age are probably better able to produce more income,
making them better off, whereas households that have either specialized in grain
production or have more of their labor allocated to grain production are less likely
to have grown quickly, because returns to labor in other activities are typically
much higher.
Migration has a negative, statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability that
a household is a non-performer (Table 5). The coefﬁcient is somewhat difﬁcult
to interpret, because the distribution changes a great deal as an additional migrant
is added to the household (row 1); however, if we use the standard deﬁnition,
the slope of the distribution at the mean implies that an additional migrant would
decrease the probability of a household being a non-performer by 39%, ceteris
paribus. Households that have been able to send out seasonal migrants are far
more likely to have growth rates that were above the 25th percentile of the dis-
tribution than households that were not. This ﬁnding holds for the subsample of
poor households; conditional on a household having been poor in 1992, they were
signiﬁcantly less likely to have experienced stagnant growth if they have begun to
send out migrants.
Combined, the results of our exercise show that households that have begun
to participate in migration have experienced faster growth than other households,
ceteris paribus. Although migrant households are not any more likely to have
experienced extremely rapid growth during the study period than non-migrant
households, we ﬁnd that they are much less likely to have stagnated. The latter
ﬁnding is true whether or not households were below the poverty line in 1992-3.
Households may be taking advantage of migration to limit income and therefore
consumption risk, as the covariance of migrant earnings and agricultural earnings
should be weak. The second effect we are likely seeing is that migrants are able
to take advantage of higher seasonal wages away from the farm, conditional on
having information about these jobs through networks.
5 Conclusion
Vietnam’s rapid economic growth since the beginning of Doi Moi has led to
strong, rapid economic growth. In this paper, we explore how that growth has
spread microeconomically. Between 1992 and 1997, the mean growth rate of
household per capita expenditures in rural Vietnam was 5.8%. However, as we
show in this paper, some households beneﬁted much more from growth, whereas
other households saw their expenditures stagnate.
13Wefurthershowthathouseholdsthathavebeguntosendoutseasonalmigrants
have beneﬁted more from transition than those that have not. Whereas migration
participation was quite low in 1992, we ﬁnd that at the household level it had
increased sixfold. Our regression results show that once we instrument the migra-
tion variable with a variable that proxies for the strength of the migrant network at
the commune level commonly used in the literature (e.g. Taylor et al., 1996), we
ﬁnd that an additional migrant will increase expenditure growth by 4.8%, hold-
ing everything else constant. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that migrant households were
much less likely to have seen their expenditures stagnate over the period, as they
were less likely to be categorized as non-performers.
There are several reasons that households may be using migration as part of
their development strategy, all of which fall out of Stark’s theory of migration. It
could be that households want to limit income or consumption risk, though in a
growing environment, this motivation is somewhat less likely, since expectations
of the next year’s income should be higher than present income for most house-
holds. These households, conditional on knowing that jobs are available, may
be taking advantage of higher returns to labor to help the family while their la-
bor is not required on the farm. Unfortunately, we cannot discern between these
motivations in this paper.
We do ﬁnd that the households that have begun to participate in migration
seem to had lower incomes than other households in 1992, which implies that
encouraging migration would seem to be a sensible government policy. there
are several ways that Vietnam’s government could help encourage the creation
of migrant networks. Since the proportion of the population living in rural ar-
eas always declines with economic growth (Taylor and Martin, 2001), Vietnam’s
government should want to help rural residents ﬁnd jobs outside of rural areas,
particularly more remote areas. Better roads or transportation links with areas not
currently sending out migrants would help. Two regions stand out in our analy-
sis; the Northern Uplands and the Central Highlands both have much lower than
average participation in migration, as well as lower growth rates. The govern-
ment could also attempt to educate people in regions not being served about job
possibilities and wages in other areas.
In future work, we plan to more exactly pinpoint the way migration has af-
fected Vietnam’s economy by studying two aspects of migration more closely.
First, we plan to study the role of migrant destinations in the household level out-
comes. It is likely that migrants that go to Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, where
wages are higher, have an even larger effect on household expenditures. Second,
we plan to describe the effects of migration on the expenditure distribution in rural
14Vietnam in general. We know that migration has increased the growth rate, and
we know that migrant households are more likely to have come from the lower
half of the expenditure distribution in 1992. However, we do not know whether
migration has helped Vietnam limit inequality or whether migration has exacer-
bated inequality. Since Vietnam’s growth has largely come without increases in
inequality, policy makers might be interested in understanding whether or not fur-
ther increases in migration would increase or decrease inequality.
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Figure 1: Household Per-Capita Expenditures
18Table 1: Selected characteristics of Migrant Households, VLSS, 1992 and 1997
1992 1997
Number of Migrant Households 65 369
Median Expenditures 1264 1437
Median Growth Rates 7.3 5.9
Commune Geography
Coastal 5.3% 21.3%
Inland Delta 2.1% 11.2%
Hills/Midlands 0.5% 24.2%
Low Mountains 1.3% 5.6%
High mountains 0.2% 2.4%
Notes: “Median Expenditures” refers to the median household per-capita expenditures.
All descriptive statistics are conditional on migration occurring.
Source: VLSS.
19Table 2: Selected Differences Between Migrant and Non-Migrant Households,
Vietnam
Migrant HHs Other HHs
Median Per-Capita Expenditures 1447 1514
Mean Per-Capita Expenditures 1693 1736
Below Poverty Line 63.1% 56.4%
Mean Expenditure Growth Rate 6.3% 5.7%
Age of Household Head 44.1 45.2
Years of Education, Household Head 66.39 5.50
Household Size 5.38 5.0
Notes: Households characterized as “migrant households” increased their participation
in migration between 1992 and 1997. Therefore, any households either with the same
level of participation or discontinuing participation in migration are categorized as “other”
households, which explains the difference between this table and Table 1.
Source: VLSS.
20Table 3: Effects of Migration on Household Expenditure Growth, Vietnam
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration 0.0019 0.048** 0.0017 0.045**
(0.0031) (0.016) (0.003) (0.017)
Household Demographics
Women, aged over 55 0.005 0.005 0.007* 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Men, aged over 60 0.014** 0.012** 0.011** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Women, aged 18-55 0.006** 0.0053** 0.006** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Men, aged 18-60 0.017** 0.014** 0.015** 0.013**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Children, aged 6-17 −0.008** 0.009** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Logarithm, Household Size −0.104** −0.103** −0.106** −0.106**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household Head Characteristics
Years of Schooling −0.001 −0.001 −0.0004 −0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Age of Head −0.0012* −0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0007)
(Age Squared)/1000 0.009 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Household Endowments, 1992
Logarithm, Land in Perennials 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
Logarithm, Land in Annuals −0.002** −0.0014**
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Own Bicycle? (1=yes) 0.006** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Own Motorbike? (1=yes) 0.003 0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 3492 3492
R2 0.11 0.18
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 9.30 6.78
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 5% level. All variables that appear in columns 1-4 are changes in the variables;
variables that appear in only columns 3-4 are levels in the 1992-3 survey. Regional dummies and
some commune characteristics included in columns 3 and 4, but not reported.
Source: VLSS.
21Table 4: Effects of Migration on Performer Categorization, Vietnam
Explanatory All HHs Poor HHs
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration 0.394 0.134 0.525 0.187
(0.263) (0.304) (0.338) (0.400)
Household Demographics
Women, aged over 55 0.050 0.063 0.159* 0.215**
(0.067) (0.071) (0.089) (0.095)
Men, aged over 60 0.129 0.111 0.088 0.038
(0.079) (0.084) (0.111) (0.107)
Women, aged 18-55 −0.005 −0.015 −0.036 −0.016
(0.041) (0.043) (0.054) (0.056)
Men, aged 18-60 0.165** 0.172** 0.122** 0.165**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.055) (0.058)
Children, aged 6-17 0.056** 0.024 0.030 0.015
(0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.013)
Logarithm, Household Size −1.05** −1.17** −1.04** −1.28**
(0.107) (0.113) (0.145) (0.157)
Household Head Characteristics
Years of Schooling −0.008 −0.003 0.013 0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Age of Head −0.017 −0.034**
(0.013) (0.016)
Age Squared 0.0001 0.00034**
(0.0001) (0.00016)
Household Endowments, 1992
Logarithm, Land in Perennials 0.108
(0.155)
Logarithm, Land in Annuals −0.034** −0.047**
(0.010) (0.014)
Own Bicycle? (1=yes) 0.062 0.017
(0.054) (0.067)
Own Motorbike? (1=yes) 0.033 0.614**
(0.130) (0.292)
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 1993 1993
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signﬁ-
ciance at the 5% level. All variables that appear in columns 1 and 3 are changes in the variables;
variables that appear in only columns 2 and 4 are levels in the 1992-3 survey. Regional dummies
and some commune characteristics included in columns 2 and 4, but not reported. Columns (3)
and (4) only include households designated “poor” by the World Bank poverty line in 1992.
Source: VLSS.
22Table 5: Effects of Migration on Non-Performer Categorization, Vietnam
Explanatory All HHs Poor HHs
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration −1.02** −1.31** −1.50** −1.39**
(0.316) (0.387) (0.540) (0.637)
Household Demographics
Women, aged over 55 −0.026 −0.031 −0.063 −0.077
(0.075) (0.080) (0.122) (0.122)
Men, aged over 60 −0.183** −0.128 −0.124 −0.143
(0.084) (0.090) (0.140) (0.146)
Women, aged 18-55 −0.078 −0.059 −0.084 −0.095
(0.044) (0.047) (0.072) (0.074)
Men, aged 18-60 −0.244** −0.216** −0.177** −0.191**
(0.044) (0.049) (0.075) (0.080)
Children, aged 6-17 −0.147** −0.131** −0.125** −0.137**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.039)
Logarithm, Household Size 1.58** 1.40** 1.48** 1.48**
(0.112) (0.178) (0.196) (0.196)
Household Head Characteristics
Years of Schooling 0.006 −0.003 0.004 −0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018)
Age of Head 0.012 0.013
(0.014) (0.020)
Age Squared −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Household Endowments, 1992
Logarithm, Land in Perennials 0.092
(0.143)
Logarithm, Land in Annuals 0.001 0.011
(0.010) (0.0120
Own Bicycle? (1=yes) −0.102 −0.084
(0.058) (0.087)
Own Motorbike? (1=yes) −0.147
(0.154)
Equation Statistics
N 3492 3492 1993 1993
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signﬁ-
ciance at the 5% level. All variables that appear in columns 1 and 3 are changes in the variables;
variables that appear in only columns 2 and 4 are levels in the 1992-3 survey. Regional dummies
and some commune characteristics included in columns 2 and 4, but not reported. Columns (3)
and (4) only include households designated “poor” by the World Bank poverty line in 1992.
Source: VLSS.
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